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Abstract Recently, an identity-based quadratic exponenti-
ation randomized cryptosystem scheme using the discrete
logarithm problem and the integer factorization problem has
been developed. Their contribution lies in that they initiated
an idea to create the identity-based cryptographic scheme
without bilinear pair. This scheme can achieve the secu-
rity goal of protecting data and prevent the adversary from
snooping the encrypted data, and finding the secrete keys.
In this paper, we have proposed some modification in setup
phase using floor function and super-increasing sequence,
and modified the encryption and decryption process in the
identity-based quadratic exponentiation randomized crypto-
graphic scheme.We also discuss how to enhance the security
of proposed scheme and processing cost of the proposed
scheme.
Keywords Cryptography · Identity-based quadratic
exponentiation randomized cryptosystem · Discrete
logarithm problem · Integer factorization problem ·
Quadratic exponentiation randomized
Introduction
Rapid advances in computer technology and the develop-
ment of the Internet are changing the way of daily life. We
also organize our daily and business lives according to Inter-
net facility. Secrecy is an important issue with respect to
sensitive data transferred over insecure public channels. In
an open network environment, secret session key needs to be
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shared between two users before it establishes a secret com-
munication [7,16–18]. As the number of users in the network
is increasing, key distribution will become a serious prob-
lem. The public key cryptosystem can effectively solve the
session key distribution problem in an open network environ-
ment, but each user should authenticate the public key of the
partner before using it. The public key infrastructure (PKI) is
proposed to implement the authentication of the public key,
but it leads to large management overheads.
In 1984, the concept of the identity-based cryptographic
scheme was introduced by Shamir [1]. According to his
idea, the public key of each user is just extracted from his
public identity information, such as e-mail address, iden-
tity number, etc. [1]. Using each user’s public identity as
his public key can escape the problem of authentication
of the public key, and it enables users to establish the
session key in the non-interactive form. However, Shamir
only succeeded in constructing an Identity-based signature
scheme. When Boneh et al. [17] constructed identity-based
encryption using the property of Weil pairing, designed
the Identity-based cryptographic scheme, and then only, it
was practically implemented. However, the bilinear pair
operations make the cryptographic scheme unsuitable to
low-performance devices [20]. Tsujii and Itoh [21] also pro-
posed an identity-based cryptographic scheme using theDLP
with single discrete exponent which uses the ElGamal [22]
public key cryptographic scheme. Recently, Meshram [8]
used the variant of IFP and DLP to construct their identity-
based encryption scheme and proposed many identity-based
cryptographic techniques [9–12] which have been proposed.
However, in these techniques, the public key of each entity
is not only an identity, it is some random number selected
either by the entity or by the trusted authority.
As above outline, the new identity-based cryptographic
schemes always face security challenges and confidentiality
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worries. The main contribution of our new efficient identity-
based QER cryptographic scheme is the key generation
phase. In this study, we design an efficient identity-based
QER cryptographic scheme using the property of DLP with
distinct discrete exponent and IFP. We have also discussed
enhancement of security and processing cost of efficient
identity-based QER cryptographic scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: review of
Meshram and Obaidat’s identity-based QER cryptographic
scheme is discussed in Sect. 2. An efficient identity-based
QER cryptographic scheme is proposed in Sect. 3. The
security analysis and security proof of our new scheme
are presented in Sect. 4. Performance comparison of pro-
posed identity-based cryptographic schemes and other six
schemes are described in Sect. 5. Enhancement of security
and processing cost of identity-based QER cryptographic
scheme are explained in Sect. 6. Finally, in Sect. 7, we con-
clude the paper.
Review of Meshram and Obaidat’s identity-based
QER cryptographic scheme
To describe it briefly, Meshram and Obaidat’s [13] identity-
basedQER cryptographic scheme can be summarized as four
related sub-algorithms, such as Setup, Extraction, Encryp-
tion, and Decryption. The Setup algorithm is run by Private
Key Generator (PKG) to generate its public and private keys.
On receiving the registered application of a user, PKG will
run the Extraction algorithm to generate the private key of
this user if the user is identified to be legal. If some user wants
to securely send amessage to another user, he/she can run the
Encryption algorithm to encrypt the message with the iden-
tity of the latter. On receiving the ciphertext, the receiver can
run the Decryption algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext with
his private key.Most of the existing identity-based cryptosys-
tems are described in this form [7], so it is easy for readers
to understand our QER description of Meshram and Obai-
dat’s identity-based cryptographic scheme, which is shown
as follows:
Setup
PKG carries out the following steps:
1. Selected p and q random prime numbers s.t. N = pq.
Let n = |N | be the bit number and compute Euler-phi
function ϕ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1).
2. Select two arbitrary random integers e and d, 1 ≤ e, d ≤
ϕ(N ) satisfying the conditions gcd(e, ϕ(N )) = 1, and
ed ≡ 1(modϕ(N )).
3. Generate n-dimensional vector b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn)
defined over multiplicative cyclic group Z∗ϕ(N ), under
the condition 1 ≤ bi ≤ ϕ(N ), (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and bi =
b j (modϕ(N )), (i = j).
4. Compute n-dimensional vector h=(h1, h2, h3, . . . , hn),
where hi =αbimod N (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
PKG uses (N , e, α, h) as its public key and informs it to each
entity, and at the same time, it uses (b, d) as its private key
and keeps it secret.
Extraction
PKG carries out the following steps to compute the private
key of the entity i , whose identity is a k-dimensional binary
vector IDi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xik), xi j ∈ {0, 1}, (1 ≤ j ≤ k).
1. Compute the entity i′s extended ID, Ri as follows:
Ri = (IDi )e(mod N )
= (yi1, yi2, yi3, . . . , yit ), yi j ∈ {0, 1}, (1 ≤ j ≤ t .)
2. Entity i ′s secrete keys si is computed by inner product
of b and Ri as follows:
si = bRi (modϕ(N )) =
∑
1≤ j≤n
b j yi j mod(ϕ(N )).
Note that IDi is used as the public key of the entity i .
Encryption
Entity 2 wants to send the message M to entity 1, and then
entity 2 can encrypt M as follows:
1. Compute the entity 1’s extended ID, R1 by the following
form:
R1 = (ID1)e(mod N )
= (y11, y12, y13, . . . , y1t ),









(αbi )y1i (mod N )
= α
∑
1≤i≤n bi y1imod(ϕ(N ))(mod N )
= αs1(mod N ).
Using Y1 and PKG’s public information h, we follow the next
steps:
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3. Compute C1 = (αk)e(mod N ).
4. Compute C2 = (M(αs1)k)e(mod N ).
Then, the ciphertext is given by C = (C1,C2).
Decryption
Entity 1 does the following to recover the plaintext M from
the ciphertext
1. Compute Cϕ(N )−s11 (mod N ) = C−s11 (mod N ).
2. It uses secrete key s1 to recover M as follows:
(C−s11 ∗ C2)d(mod N ) = (α−s1keMeαs1ke)d(mod N )
= Med(mod N )
= M(mod N ).
Propose an efficient identity-based QER
cryptographic scheme
The efficient identity-based QER cryptographic scheme is
more secure than the previous scheme presented byMeshram
andObaidat’s [13] in termsof security.Weusedfloor function
and super-increasing sequence to develop themaster key pair
in this scheme. It is very difficult for attacker or adversary to
find the private key and break the communication between
different parties in low time period as compared with the
scheme described in [13]. It is also very difficult to maintain
the communication cost for breaking the system in view of
our proposed scheme.
New efficient identity-based QER cryptographic scheme
is described in four sub-algorithms, such as Setup, Extrac-
tion, Encryption, and Decryption, which are shown as
follows.
Setup
The Setup algorithm is the same as only steps 1–4 in Sect. 2
[13] of this paper. The different steps from scheme [13] are
as follows:
1. Select a natural number satisfying the conditions
gcd(β, ϕ(N )) = 1 and β < 	ϕ(N )/n
, where 	x

denote the floor functionwhich implies the largest integer
smaller than x .
2. Choose super-increasing sequence corresponding to b as
b′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) when satisfies
∑i−1
j=1 b′j + δ < ϕ(N )
where δ < 	ϕ(N )/β
, and ∑nj=1 b′j < ϕ(N ).
3. Compute bi = b′β(modϕ(N )) and ci = bi (modβ),
(1 ≤ i ≤ n)
4. Compute n-dimensional vectors v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn),
where vl = dlbl(modϕ(N )), (1 ≤ l ≤ n).
PKG uses (N , e, h) as his public key and informs it to each
entity, and at the same time, it uses (v, d) as his private key
and keeps it secret.
Extraction
PKG carries out the following steps to compute the private
key of the entity i , whose identity is a k-dimensional binary
vector IDi = (xi1, xi2, . . . , xik), xi j ∈ {0, 1}, (1 ≤ j ≤ k) .
1. Compute as the extended of entity i’s, by the following:
Ri = (IDi )e(mod N ) = (yi1, yi2, . . . , yit ),
yi j ∈ {0, 1}, (1 ≤ j ≤ t).
2. Entity i ′s secrete keys si is computed by inner product
of vl and Ri as follows:
si = vl Ri (modϕ(N )) =
∑
1≤ j≤n
vl yi jmod (ϕ(N ))
Encryption
Entity 2 wants to send the message M to entity 1, and entity
2 can encrypt M as follows:
1. Compute the entity i’s extended ID,R1by the following:










((αbi )y1i )di (mod N )
= α
∑
1≤i≤n vl y1imod(ϕ(N ))(mod N )
= αs1(mod N ).
From Y1 and PKG’s public information h
3. Compute Y2 = αϕ(N )−s1(mod N ) = α−s1(mod N ).
4. Compute the ciphertext C = (Mαs1 .)e(mod N )
Decryption
Entity 1 does the following to recover the plaintext M from
the cipher text:
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1. Use his private key s1 to recover M as M = (Y e2 ∗ C)d
(mod N ).
The correctness of the proposed scheme can be shown as
follows:
Due to Y e2 = (α−s1)e(mod N )
We have (Y e2 ∗ C)d(mod N ) ≡ (α−s1eMeαs1e)d(mod N ) ≡
Med(mod N ) ≡ M(mod N ).
Security analysis and discussions
The security of identity-based QER cryptographic scheme
is based on the index problems, such as IFP and DLP,
which define over multiplicative cyclic group Z∗N . Applying
Meshram and Meshram attacking method [14] to the pro-
posed system, itmay be noted that center’s secret information
may be disclosed.
Theorem 1 [14] The (n + 1) entities’ i, (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1)
can derive an n-dimensional vector v′i over Z∗ϕ(N ) which is
equivalent (not necessarily identical) to the original PKG ’s
secret information.
Proof When (n + 1) entities’ i, (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) conspire,
then system of linear congruence is as follows:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
R1 0 0 0
· · ·








0 0 Rn 0
· · ·





v1 0 0 0
· · ·








0 0 vn−1 0
· · ·















(mod ϕ (N )) . (1)
However, each Ri is an n-dimensional binary vector, there












wi si = D ϕ(N ). (4)
The (n + 1) entities can have an integer multiple of ϕ(N ), if
D = 0. Then, they can find out the factorization of N . A sim-
ilar methodwith attack (Theorem 1) is applicable. Hence, the
PKG’s secret information can be derived by (n + 1)-entities
conspiracy.
Furthermore, Meshram developed a more general attack-
ing method [2] for the modified system, such that (n + 2)
entities conspiracy can derive the PKG ’s secret information
with high probability.
Theorem 2 [2] The (n + 2) entities’ i, (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 2) can
derive the PKG ’s secret information v with high probability.
Proof When (n + 1) entities i, (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1) conspire,
theyhave the following systemof linear congruence’s defined
by the following equation:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
R1 0 0 0
· · ·








0 0 Rn 0
· · ·





v1 0 0 0
· · ·








0 0 vn−1 0
· · ·















(mod ϕ (N )) (5)
= Ba(modϕ (N )). (6)
Assuming that the matrix B includes n linearly independent
column vectors over Zϕ(N ), there exist some positive integers
wi (1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1), such that
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
R1 0 0 0
· · ·








0 0 Rn 0
· · ·





v1 0 0 0
· · ·








0 0 vn−1 0
· · ·
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Then, Eq. (7) can be rewritten by the following form:
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
R1 0 0 0 s1
· · ·


















v1 0 0 0
· · ·








0 0 vn−1 0
· · ·
















= B ′v′i . (9)
The matrix B in Eq. (6) includes n linearly independent col-
umn vectors over Zϕ(N ) by supposition, it follows that the
matrix B ′ is non-singular over Zϕ(N ) [i.e., det (B ′) = 0]
with overwhelming probability, and thus, we have v′i =
0(modϕ(N )). On the other hand, we have the following sys-
tem of linear congruences:
B ′v′i = 0(modϕ(N )). (10)
If the matrix B ′ is non-singular over Z∗ϕ(N ), then v
′
i =
0(modϕ(N )), and this contradicts the above results. Thus,
the matrix D′ is singular overZ∗ϕ(N ), and we have det (B ′) =
0(modϕ(N ))with high probability. It shows that det (B ′)) is
divisible by ϕ(N ) with high probability. Furthermore, con-
sider the case where the other (n + 1) entities among (n + 2)
conspire, and define the matrix D′′ in a way similar to the
above. Then, det (B ′′) is divisible by ϕ(N ) with high prob-
ability. Hence, gcd (det(B ′), det (B ′′)) gives dϕ(N ), where
d is a small positive integer. By the above procedure, we can
evaluate ϕ(N ) efficiently. An additional procedure to find the
center’s secret information is completely the same as attack
(Theorem 2).
Performance comparison of identity-based
cryptographic schemes
In this section, we have discussed six most widely used
identity-based cryptographic schemes and compared their
performance. These eight identity-based cryptographic
schemes are: cocks identity-based cryptographic scheme
[5], authenticated identity-based cryptographic scheme [3],
selective-identity secure identity-based cryptographic
scheme without random oracles [15], hierarchical identity-
based cryptographic scheme [6], water’s identity-based
cryptographic scheme [4], Meshram and Obaidat’s identity-
based QER cryptographic scheme [13], and our proposed
efficient Identity-based QER cryptographic scheme. These
schemes have different performances on server for evaluating
Encryption algorithm performance, Decryption algorithm
performance, and computational cost.
Notations used in this computation are as follows:
TP = The time of executing a paring operation.
TM = The time of executing a modular multiplication.
Te = The time of executing a modular exponentiation in
group.
Tm = The time of executing a scalar or point multiplication
in group.
Tx = The time of executing an XOR operation.
TH = The time of executing a map to point hash function.
Th = The time of executing a one-way hash function.
Ta = The time of executing a modular addition operation.
Ti = The time of executing a modular inverses operation.
Tj = The time of executing a Jacobi symbol operation.
As we all know, the time of executing a paring operation
TP is more time-consuming than other operations. Some per-
formance simulation results [17] demonstrate that Ta and Th
are trivial in comparison with Te, TM, Tx, TH , Ti, and Tj.
It is to be noted that encryption algorithmic phase and
decryption algorithmic phase are the dominating process in
terms of computation cost than setup and extract phases as
they are executed only once. Thus, we consider only the
encryption and decryption phase and accordingly compare
the proposed identity-based cryptographic scheme with [3–
6,13,15]. We demonstrate the comparative result in Table 1
in terms of computational cost and security properties.
It is quite clear from the above table that the proposed effi-
cient identity-based QER cryptographic scheme bears lower
computational cost than [3–6,13,15].
Enhancement of security and processing cost
The PKG’s secret information for the original system is
derived by n entities conspiracy in Sect. 3. Now, we con-
sider the practical countermeasure for the enhancement of
the security of the system. Here, we used the partitioning
strategy [19] for enhancement the security of present scheme.
The basic idea is to divide the identity-space into two disjoint
segments, depending upon the outcome of a biased coin. For
simplicity, we assume that n = 512 throughout this section.
The PKG partitions a 512-dimensional binary vector A into
256 segments, every two bits, such as
A = (a1, a2, a3, . . . . . . a511, a512)
= (seg1, seg2, seg3, . . . . . . seg511, seg512). (11)
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Table 1 Comparisons among our proposed identity-based cryptographic scheme and previously proposed identity-based cryptographic schemes
Identity-based cryptographic schemes F1 F2 F3
Scheme [3] TP + TH + 3Th + Tx TP + TH + 3Th + Tx 2TP + 2TH + 6Th + 2Tx
Scheme [4] 2TP + 3Tm 2TP + Tm + Ti 4TP + 4Tm + Ti
Scheme [5] TJ + 2Ta + 2TM + 2Ti TJ + Ta 2Tj + 3Ta + 2TM + 2Ti
Scheme [6] TP + TH + Th + Te + Tm + Tx TP + Th + Tx 2TP + TH + 2Th + Te + Tm + 2Tx
Scheme[13] 4Te + Tm 2Te + Tm + Ti 6Te + 2Tm + Ti
Scheme [15] TP + 4Te + 2TM TP + Te + TM + Ti 2TP + 5Te + 3TM + Ti
Proposed scheme 2Te + Tm + Ti 2Te + Tm + Ti 4Te + 2Tm + 2Ti
F1: computational cost for encryption phase, F2: computational cost for decryption phase, F3: overall computational cost for encryption and
decryption phases
Table 2 Example of h(i; jk) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 and jk ∈ {0, 1}
h(1: 11) = 9 h(2: 11) = 11 h(3: 11) = 18 h(4: 11) = 22
h(1: 00) = 5 h(2: 00) = 21 h(3: 00) = 4 h(4: 00) = 16
h(1: 01) = 13 h(2: 01) = 17 h(3: 01) = 23 h(4: 01) = 2
h(1: 10) = 12 h(2: 10) = 7 h(3: 10) = 15 h(4: 10) = 8
Then, the PKG defines v(i; jk)(1 ≤ i ≤ 256; j, k ∈ {0, 1})
appropriately, computes h(i; jk), (1≤ i ≤256; j, k∈{0, 1}),
h(i; jk) = αv(i; jk)(mod N ) (12)
for each segi , and publishes the table, including every
h(i; jk) to all entities. Furthermore, the center computes each




v(i; segki )(modϕ(N )) (13)
depending on Sect. 3. The entity k’s extended identity, Rk ,
where Rk is partitioned into 256 segments. Every two bits,
such as:
Rk = (segk1, segk2, segk3, . . . segk255, segk256).
Then, the center distributes it to each entity through a highly
secure channel. Table 2 gives an example of h(i; jk).
It is quite clear from the above table that the partition-
ing strategy enhances the security of proposed scheme using
the pairing of two difference bit segments as compare the
previous scheme [13].
Encryption




h(i; seg1i )ei (modN ) (14)
from Y1 and the published table. Entity 2 uses γ ′ as γ in the
original system (in Sect. 3) to encrypt the message M .
Decryption
It is exactly the same as in the original system in Sect. 3.
In the original system in Sect. 3, the PKG’s secret infor-
mation is derived by 512 entities conspiracy, while in the
above system, it is derived by 1024 (=4 × 256) entities con-
spiracy. Furthermore, the running cost for encryption-key
generation in the above system is about half of the original
system. However, the KAC’s public information in the above
system is about twice than the original system. Further gener-
alizations, e.g., eachYi is partitioned into 128 segments every
four bits, etc., are possible and such schemes are regarded as
the hybrid system of the identity-based cryptosystem and the
conventional public key cryptosystem.
Conclusion
In this study, the proposed efficient identity-based QER
cryptographic scheme must satisfy Shamir’s original con-
cepts in a strict sense, i.e., it does not need any interactive
earliest communications in, respectively, data transmission.
It provides longer and higher levels of security than the
schemes using IFP and the general formulation of DLP. The
presented scheme needs nominal operations in encryption
and decryption proses, thus makes it is very efficient. The
offered out comes provides the special result from the secu-
rity point of view, becausewe face the problemof solving IFP
and DLP simultaneously in the multiplicative group define
over finite fields as compared with the other identity-based
cryptographic scheme. Using our propose scheme, we can
develop an identity-based encryption model based on light-
weight public key management techniques. It has small sizes
key pair’s private and public keys as compared with other
Identity-based cryptographic schemes available in literature.
It is more benefited in grid security architecture. The grid
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environment may have a large number of members that join
and leave over time and that certificates are used extensively
for every job submission. This would inevitably complicate
key management and increase the bandwidth requirement of
a grid system. It was also noted that these problems could be
simplified using certificate-free identity-based cryptographic
scheme. Moreover, in the identity-based cryptographic set-
ting, a user’s public key can be created and used immediately
without the need for a public key certificate to be forwarded to
the intended recipient [normally via a Transport Layer Secu-
rity (TLS) handshake]. However, the supposedly dynamic
use of identity-based keys was hindered by some tradi-
tional limitations of identity-based cryptographic scheme,
such as key escrow, and the need to distribute private keys
through secure channels. More importantly, some of the
essential security requirements desired in the Globus Toolkit
(GT) require using proxy credentials for single sign-on and
delegation, but our developed efficient identity-based QER
cryptographic scheme is free from certificate and key escrow
problems.
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